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‘HUMANISING THE EU MIGRATION POLICY: RECOGNISING IRREGULAR 
MIGRANTS’ HUMANITY’ 
Sylvie Da Lomba, Law School, University of Strathclyde 
The basic premise of my talk is that the EU’s migration policy is not and cannot be fit for 
purpose because and so long as it dehumanises migrants and migration.  
To date, the EU migration policy has failed to recognise migration for what it is: a 
fundamentally human and universal phenomenon. The problematising, securitisation and 
criminalisation of irregular migrants and migration show how the EU migration policy confines 
the human to its margins. 
I posit that the persisting failings of the EU migration policy call for a radical rethink of the EU 
migration policy. In this regard, I contend that fuller vulnerability analysis offers a potent 
critical device to engage in a fundamental rethink of the EU migration policy that firmly 
locates the human at its core.  
Fuller vulnerability analysis interrogates the purpose of the EU’s migration policy and 
unravels the relationships that form its fabric. In doing so, it tests the EU’s self-affirmation 
as a global human rights champion and promoter of core human values and principles. 
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Before I delve into fuller vulnerability analysis and discuss how, in my view, it can transform 
and humanise the EU’s migration policy, it is important to stress that vulnerability analysis 
must be distinguished from the language of vulnerability routinely deployed in migration 
policies.  
Migration policies, including the EU’s migration policy, commonly identify vulnerable 
groups of migrants. We are all familiar with the image of the vulnerable irregular migrant at 
the mercy of ruthless smugglers. I do not contest the vulnerability of migrants. What I take 
issue with, however, is the EU’s underpinning understanding of vulnerability and the EU’s 
instrumentalisation of this concept to serve its migration policy objectives. Here I would like 
to highlight three key issues with the language of vulnerability in migration policies: 
• First, this language creates an arbitrary binary between the vulnerable and the 
invulnerable. It upholds the liberal theory’s fictional invulnerable subject, thereby 
ignoring a fundamental human reality => vulnerability comes with being human. I will 
come back to this point as it is fundamental to vulnerability analysis. This, in turn, 
yields distorted versions of human vulnerability and thus human life. For example, EU 
directives identify vulnerable migrant populations: 
E.g. ‘minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant 
women, single parents with minor children, victims of human trafficking, persons with 
serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who have been subjected 
to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence’ 
(Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third-country nationals, Article 3(9)). Are we to assume, for 
example, that young adult male migrants are invulnerable?  
• Secondly, because vulnerability is seen as a deviation from the ‘norm’ – invulnerability 
-, it is exclusively associated with negative connotations such as harm and suffering. 
Persons cast vulnerable are thus commonly stereotyped and stigmatised as well as 
objectified and silenced. For example, the term ‘vulnerable’ too often serves to 
portray migrants in a negative light, as helpless victims. Because vulnerability is 
understood as victimisation and passivity, so-called vulnerable persons are exposed 
to paternalistic responses.   
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More recently, the label vulnerable has been attached to migratory situations rather 
than migrants (2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants). However, this 
approach replicates the drawbacks of the vulnerable group approach. Those migrants 
deemed in a vulnerable situation are themselves deemed vulnerable. Besides, the 
notion of vulnerable situation is equally arbitrary. Typically, the New York Declaration 
focuses on ‘large movements’ of migrants and only envisages vulnerable situations 
within this specific migratory framework. Because it ‘almost exclusively deals with the 
situation of migrants prior to their arrival in the country of destination’, it glosses over 
the pull factors of migration and destination countries’ responsibilities.  
• Thirdly and lastly, the language of vulnerability deployed in migration policies is not 
the protective device that it purports to be. The language of vulnerability is deployed 
- or not - to serve migration policy objectives. Tellingly, the image of the vulnerable 
migrant does not dislodge the construction of the migrant as a problem and a threat; 
rather it participates in the securitisation of migration and migrants. Mainwaring 
points out that  
‘In the Mediterranean, migrants are rendered victims (…); however, once 
ashore on EU territory, they quickly become risky, securitized bodies, possible 
villains’ (Mainwaring 2016).1  
Revealingly, the depiction of migrants as the victims of ruthless smugglers conceals 
their vulnerability to EU and Member States’ policies: 
‘Much of the suffering and death that we witness at Europe’s borders is 
indeed the result of European border policies instituted over the last 20 years 
that make safe and legal travel to Europe all but impossible for those fleeing 
war and poverty.’2  
This instrumentalisation of the language of vulnerability in migration policies is further 
apparent in its deployment as a mere rhetorical tool. For example, the Returns 
Directive identifies vulnerable persons, but there are very few provisions dealing with 
any special requirements applicable to these persons and they are not far-reaching 
                                                          
1 Cetta Mainwaring, ‘Migrant Agency: Negotiating Borders and Migration Controls’ (2016) 4(3) Migration 
Studies 289-308, p. 290. 
2 Polly Palister-Wilkins, ‘Interrogating the Mediterranean “Migration Crisis” (2016) 21(2) Mediterranean Politics 
311-315, p. 312. In the same vain, see Jane Freedman, ‘Engendering Security at the Borders of Europe: Women 
Migrants and the Mediterranean “Crisis” (2018) 29(4) Journal of Refugee Studies 568-582, p. 572. 
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(Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third-country nationals, Articles 4(4)(a), 14(1)(d) and 16(3)). 
Importantly, migration policy objectives can also frustrate the deployment of the 
language of vulnerability. For instance, in December 2016, the Coordinator for the EU-
Turkey Statement recommended that Greece reconsider the exclusion of vulnerable 
asylum seekers from transfers to Turkey under the fast-track border procedure.  
So what is fuller vulnerability analysis and how does it differ from the problematic language 
of vulnerability? 
Here I draw on the work of Martha Fineman and Anna Grear. 
Fuller vulnerability analysis is best described as a ‘critical normative project’ (Grear 2013). 
It offers a powerful device to investigate the ‘systems of power and privilege that interact to 
produce the webs of advantages and disadvantages’ in which we are located with a view to 
responding to our vulnerability.  
Significantly, the counterpoint to vulnerability is not invulnerability’; vulnerability analysis 
seeks to build resilience. Resilience is ‘the critical but incomplete remedy to vulnerability’ 
(Fineman 2015). Although nothing can completely mitigate vulnerability, resilience is what 
provides individuals with the means and ability to recover from harm, setbacks and the 
misfortunes that affect [their] life’ (Fineman 2015).’ 
 
The fundamental premise of vulnerability analysis is that vulnerability is the ‘primal human 
condition’.3 Indeed, Fineman compellingly demonstrates that vulnerability has five 
fundamental traits: 
• Universal and constant: we are all vulnerable. Our vulnerability arises from ‘our 
embodiment which carries with it the ever present possibility of harm, injury and 
misfortune from mildly adverse to catastrophically devastating events whether 
accidental, intentional or otherwise’ (Fineman 2008). Our vulnerability further arises 
                                                          
3 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘Equality and Difference – The Restrained State’ (2015) 66(3) Alabama Law Review 
609-626, p. 614. 
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from our condition as embedded beings (Grear 2013). We are all vulnerable to the 
actions of others as well as institutions. 
Thus, vulnerability analysis firmly rebukes the myth of the autonomous liberal subject 
‘as the foundation of our legal and social order.’4 
• Because it is universal and constant, vulnerability is also shared. This is key to rethink 
our relationships with migrants and thus critical to rethinking the EU’s migration 
policy. 
• Vulnerability is also particular: we ‘have different forms of embodiment and also are 
differently situated within webs of economic and institutional relationships’ (Fineman 
2010-11). We therefore experience vulnerability in different ways. 
• Generative: we are both vulnerable to the actions of others and inescapably 
dependent on others. Thus, we all need reach out to others, form relationships, and 
build institutions’ (Fineman 2012).  It follows vulnerability ‘presents [us with] 
opportunities for innovation and growth, creativity, and fulfilment’ (Fineman 2012).  
Importantly, the generative dimension of vulnerability allows us to reclaim 
dependency as something positive. It mainstreams our dependency on others and on 
institutions, which is key to humanising migration policies.  
 
I advocate fuller vulnerability analysis, but I do not advocate complacency. Caution must 
always be exercised when using the concept of vulnerability. This is because the state and 
other institutions possess the power ‘to exploit and thwart its meaning and significance’ 
(Butler 2004). However, in my view, because vulnerability analysis is fundamentally critical, 
it can ‘maintain an ongoing reflexivity concerning the employment of the notion of 
vulnerability’ (Grear 2011). 
 
This theorisation of vulnerability has far-reaching consequences for our responses to 
vulnerability: 
• It redefines our relationship with institutions. Vulnerability analysis recognises that 
we all need access to institutional resources to build our resilience. Fineman points 
                                                          
4 Stu Marvel, ‘The Evolution of Plural Parentage: Applying Vulnerability Theory to Polygamy and Same-Sex 
Marriage’ (2015) 64 Emory Law Journal 2047-2088, p. 2065. 
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out that ‘interactions with institutions not only can have immediate effects, but also 
produce determinative outcomes that can significantly affect future opportunities and 
capabilities.’5 For example, elsewhere I show how constraints on irregular migrants’ 
access to health care have detrimental immediate as long as long-term effects on 
irregular migrants as well as host communities. I have also shown how precarious 
immigration statuses place hurdles on integration. 
•  Fineman convincingly argues that this calls for a responsive state (Fineman 2010-11). 
However, this is not enough. I concur with Grear that we need a fuller theorisation of 
vulnerability that recognises that the state is embedded within a ‘complex uneven 
globalised world’ (Grear 2013). The state is only one actor among many. Vulnerability 
analysis must thus be concerned with these actors’ positioning within the plethora of 
processes, systems and institutional relationships that form the fabric of our 
globalised world. It must also account for their vulnerability as human constructions. 
• The shared and generative dimensions of vulnerability have a critical role to play in 
achieving greater inclusiveness in the mobilisation and distribution of resilience-
building resources in our uneven globalised world.  
 Our shared vulnerability enables us to relate to ‘others’ as fellow (vulnerable) 
beings and therefore strengthens our emotional identification with ‘others’ 
(Carens 1996).  This is critical when it comes to reimagining our relationships with 
migrants, especially irregular migrants as they epitomise the ‘other’. Our shared 
vulnerability fosters mutual understanding and yields what Radhakrishnan 
describes as ‘a deeply ethical impulse’ that enables us ‘to envision cooperations 
and solidarities across the divide and the asymmetry’ of our globalised world 
(Radhakrishnan 2003). 
 The generative dimension of vulnerability also supports greater inclusiveness in 
the mobilisation and distribution of resilience-building resources because it 
sheds a positive light on our dependency on others. 
 
                                                          
5 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘Equality and Difference – The Restrained State’ (2015) 66(3) Alabama Law 
Review 609-626, p. 623. 
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At the start of this talk, I mentioned that fuller vulnerability analysis interrogates the purpose 
of the EU migration policy and unravels the relationships that form its fabric, and in doing 
so tests the EU’s self-affirmation as a global human rights champion and promoter of core 
human values and principles. 
The EU’s migration policy is primarily concerned with migration management. When it comes 
to irregular migration, the aim is to ‘combat’ irregular migration to and in the EU. To this end, 
the EU’s migration policy places its focus squarely on: 
• Border control 
• Security 
In 2019, the Commission stressed that the EU needed to develop ‘a collective policy on 
migration management and border security’ (Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, Progress report on the 
Implementation on the European Agenda on Migration, Brussels, 16.10.2019, COM(2019) 
481 final, para. 1). 
• Return and readmission: : formal readmission agreements or practical arrangements 
on return and readmission are in place in 23 countries of origin and transit, with extra 
support from the EU to push for effective return (Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, 
Progress report on the Implementation on the European Agenda on Migration, 
Brussels, 16.10.2019, COM(2019) 481 final, para. 1). The Commission emphasises the 
need for ‘a humane and effective return and readmission policy (European 
Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, Irregular Migration & Return, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en). I would argue that the humane dimension 
should be considered critical to achieving effectiveness if it is to pervade and shape 
this particular policy as well as the other aspects of the EU asylum policy. 
 
This focus shapes the relationships that form the fabric of the EU’s migration policy. It 
makes for a deeply EU-centric policy: 
• Pushes and confines (irregular) migrants to the margins of the EU’s migration policy. 
They are seen as ‘an unwanted burden’ whose interests are set against those of the 
EU’. 
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This approach supports the EU’s drive towards externalisation. Responsibility for this 
‘burden’ shifts to third-countries through a network of ‘informal agreements’ with 
countries of origin and countries of transit, often at the expense of migrants’ human 
rights (agreements with Turkey and Libya). The European Migration Agenda puts 
much emphasis on ‘partnerships’ with third countries. In a communication of October 
2019, the Commission opines that ‘innovative approaches to partnerships with third 
countries’ have been key to progressing the European Migration Agenda and explicitly 
mentions the EU-Turkey Agreement of March 2016 (Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, 
Progress report on the Implementation on the European Agenda on Migration, 
Brussels, 16.10.2019, COM(2019) 481 final, para. 1). 
 
 The consequences are that the EU policy: 
• Rests on an ‘us versus others’ discourse. 
• Dehumanises (irregular) migrants. They become mere objects of the EU migration 
policy. 
• Instrumentalises relationships with third countries to serve the externalisation 
agenda of the EU migration policy. 
•  Perpetuates the unevenness of our globalised world; and 
• Ultimately calls into question the EU’s self-affirmation as a global human rights 
champion and promoter of core human values and principles. 
 
Paradoxically, the EU is founded on values and principles that support the development of 
a humane migration policy.  
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society 
in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men prevail. 
Yet these values and principles have, to date, failed to shape the EU migration policy. 
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Here, I posit that fuller vulnerability analysis prompts paradigm shift in the EU migration 
policy that embraces the EU’s values and principles and as such humanises the EU migration 
policy. 
One such critical value and principle is solidarity. In my view, how the EU migration policy 
understands and practices solidarity determines the EU’s ability – or inability – to uphold 
values and principles that are central to a humane migration policy (respect for human rights; 
fair sharing of responsibility; true partnership).  
 
Solidarity has a tri-dimensional nature (Moreno-Lax 2017): 
• Vertical: institutions (including states)-persons solidarity. 
• Horizontal: inter- institutional solidarity. 
• Systemic: the whole policy must foster solidarity. 
Each facet of solidarity has an internal and external dimension.  
 
What would solidarity look like in an EU migration policy transformed by fuller vulnerability 
analysis? 
• Internal and external vertical solidarity: the EU migration policy must first and 
foremost extend solidarity to all migrants – including irregular migrants – as fellow 
human beings, whether these migrants are located within or outside the EU territory. 
 Counters the ‘us versus others’ discourse. 
 Fosters EU citizens emotional identification with migrants. 
Fuller vulnerability analysis mainstreams dependency on others and sees it as 
something to be valued: 
 Solidarity towards migrants can be de-problematised solidarity towards migrants. 
 Migrants can be given a voice in the EU migration policy: from objects to actors of 
the EU migration policy. 
• Internal and external horizontal solidarity: fuller vulnerability analysis compels the 
EU to reconsiders the nature of its internal and external relationships.  
 Internally, fuller vulnerability analysis extends solidarity to all EU Member 
States and their communities. For example, at the moment, the Common 
 
 
10 
 
European Asylum System places disproportionate responsibilities on certain 
Members States (Greece, Italy and Spain).  
 Externally, solidarity is extended to third countries (countries of origin and 
transit countries). These countries are given a voice in the EU migration policy 
with a view to developing ‘true partnerships’. This in turn compels the EU to 
reconsider it externalisation agenda. 
• Internal and external systemic solidarity: solidarity must be fostered so that the EU 
migration policy can advance good migration governance – based on a human rights-
based approach that promotes humane migration policies at all levels (see Da Lomba 
2019). 
 The EU migration policy becomes responsive to human and institutional 
vulnerability in our uneven globalised word. 
 
Concluding remarks: The EU migration needs a ‘dose’ of idealism 
The proposed transformation of the EU migration policy through fuller vulnerability analysis 
can be considered unrealistic on account of its being overly idealistic. It is certainly the case 
that the proposed endeavour has an idealistic aspect.  
However, I posit that this must not be perceived as a flaw.  Rather, an idealistic perspective is 
precisely what we need if we are to humanise the EU migration policy, especially in relation 
to irregular migrants. Indeed, ‘some degree of idealism compels us to recognise that our 
institutions and practices may not be all that they should be’ (Carens 1996). In other words, 
it compels us to be radically critical. It follows that the ‘dose’ of idealism that comes with fuller 
vulnerability analysis can prevent developments in the EU migration policy from perpetuating 
its profound shortcomings.  
 
 
